*vBulletin FAQ* The website where you learn about vBulletin Forums
Home		Download vBulletin		vBulletin FAQ Forums	vBulletin Related Sites	Contact Us

Welcome to vBulletin FAQ

vBulletin FAQ Navigation

Getting Started

Customizing your vBulletin

Search Engines & SEO

Making Money with a Forum

Promoting your Community

Get your own vBulletin Today

Webmaster Help

Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory

vBulletin Book Store > vBulletin books beginning with P

	Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory
	Author: Ken Binmore Published: 2007-03-29
	List price: $75.00 Our price: $60.00	Usually ships in 7 to 11 days As of: December 02nd, 2008 09:50:04 PM

Customer comments on this selection. Excellent Treatment of Game Theory The book is an excellent text on Game Theory. If you are into Game Theory, then this is a must have on your bookshelf. It covers Game Theory concepts in great detail and clarity. On the downside, the language used in the book, can, cat times, be vague and may require re-reading sections of the book to tease out what was being said. Nevertheless, the re-read is definitely worth it because you will find gems of wisdom bubbling to the surface. A Comprehensive Introduction As the author of an excellent and innovative text on game theory (Game Theory Evolving, Princeton University Press), Herbert Gintis is far better qualified than this reviewer to provide a substantive evaluation of Ken Binmore's new book; I encourage all prospective buyers to read Gintis' comprehensive review very carefully. br / br /I would, however, like to offer some additional information for the specific audience of mathematicians and students of mathematics who are searching for an introductory text on game theory. br / br /Ken Binmore studied mathematics before becoming an economist; thus, one might expect that this book would provide rigorous proofs for all the results used, and mathematically inclined readers will be happy to hear that this is indeed the case. The intended readership is quite broad, however, and so Binmore ensured that it is possible for those who are inclined to skip the proofs to do so without suffering serious loss of continuity. br / br /In determining whether this text is appropriate for one's specific study or instructional needs, one encounters two problems: (1) the table of contents is not available on Amazon, and (2) even when the chapter titles are made available, they are written in somewhat whimsical language that makes it difficult to determine precisely how the book is organized and precisely what it contains. In order to provide a bit of help in this area, I have provided the prospective buyer with both the chapter titles AND the section headings at the end of this review; I sincerely hope this helps in the process of determining whether this book represents a worthwhile investment, based on the specific needs of the buyer. br / br /One cautionary note for university instructors, especially instructors of mathematics; in the Preface, Binmore states that his book contains enough material for at least two courses in game theory. He writes br / br /"I have tried to make things easy for teachers who want to design a course based on selection of topics from the whole book by including marginal notes to facilitate skipping." br / br /Thus, the instructor who is used to "possible course" charts, showing clear interdependence of chapters and identifying sections that might be skipped without penalty, will not find them in this book. The inclusion of this material would definitely have been a great kindness to university instructors; scouting one's way through this 639-page text to find a realistic and effective one-semester course is not easy! br / br /Table of Contents br / br /1 Getting Locked In br / br /1.1 What is Game Theory? br /1.2 Toy Games br /1.3 The Prisoners' Dilemma br /1.4 Private Provision of Public Goods br /1.5 Imperfect Competition br /1.6 Nash Equilibrium br /1.7 Collective Rationality br /1.8 Repeating the Prisoners' Dilemma br /1.9 Which Equilibrium? br /1.10 Social Dilemmas br /1.11 Roundup br / br /2 Backing Up br / br /2.1 Where Next? br /2.2 Win-Or-Lose Games br /2.3 The Rules of the Game br /2.4 Pure Strategies br /2.5 Backward Induction br /2.6 Solving NIM br /2.7 Hex br /2.8 Chess br /2.9 Rational Play? br /2.10 Roundup br / br /3 Taking Chances br / br /3.1 Chance Moves br /3.2 Probability br /3.3 Conditional Probability br /3.4 Lotteries br /3.5 Expectation br /3.6 Values of Games with Chance Moves br /3.7 Waiting Games br /3.8 Parcheesi br /3.9 Roundup br / br /4 Accounting for Tastes br / br /4.1 Payoffs br /4.2 Revealed Preference br /4.3 Utility Functions br /4.4 Dicing with Death br /4.5 Making Risky Choices br /4.6 Utility Scales br /4.7 Dicing with Death Again br /4.8 When are People Consistent? br /4.9 Roundup br / br /5 Planning Ahead br / br /5.1 Strategic Forms br /5.2 Payoff Functions br /5.3 Matrices and Vectors br /5.4 Domination br /5.5 Credibility and Commitment br /5.6 Living in an Imperfect World br /5.7 Roundup br / br /6 Mixing Things Up br / br /6.1 Mixed Strategies br /6.2 Reaction Curves br /6.3 Interpreting Mixed Strategies br /6.4 Payoffs and Mixed Strategies br /6.5 Convexity br /6.6 Payoff Regions br /6.7 Roundup br / br /7 Fighting it Out br / br /7.1 Strictly Competitive Games br /7.2 Zero-Sum Games br /7.3 Minimax and Maximin br /7.4 Safety First br /7.5 Solving Zero-Sum Games br /7.6 Linear Programming br /7.7 Separating Hyperplanes br /7.8 Starships br /7.9 Roundup br / br /8 Keeping Your Balance br / br /8.1 Introduction br /8.2 Dueling Again br /8.3 When do Nash Equilibria Exist? br /8.4 Hexing Brouwer br /8.5 The Equilibrium Selection Problem br /8.6 Conventions br /8.7 Roundup br / br /9 Buying Cheap br / br /9.1 Economic Models br /9.2 Partial Derivatives br /9.3 Preferences in Commodity Spaces br /9.4 Trade br /9.5 Monopoly br /9.6 Perfect Competition br /9.7 Consumer Surplus br /9.8 Roundup br / br /10 Selling Dear br / br /10.1 Models of Imperfect Competition br /10.2 Cournot Models br /10.3 Stackelberg Models br /10.4 Bertrand Models br /10.5 Edgeworth Models br /10.6 Roundup br / br /11 Repeating Yourself br / br /11.1 Reciprocity br /11.2 Repeating a Zero-Sum Game br /11.3 Repeating the Prisoners' Dilemma br /11.4 Infinite Repetitions br /11.5 Social Contract br /11.6 The Evolution of Cooperation br /11.7 Roundup br / br /12 Getting the Message br / br /12.1 Knowledge and Belief br /12.2 Dirty Faces br /12.3 Knowledge br /12.4 Possibility Sets br /12.5 Information Sets br /12.6 Common Knowledge br /12.7 Complete Information br /12.8 Agreeing to Disagree? br /12.9 Coordinated Action br /12.10 Roundup br / br /13 Keeping Up to Date br / br /13.1 Rationality br /13.2 Bayesian Updating br /13.3 Bayesian Rationality br /13.4 Getting the Model Right br /13.5 Scientific Induction? br /13.6 Constructing Priors br /13.7 Bayesian Rationality in Games br /13.8 Roundup br / br /14 Seeking Refinement br / br /14.1 Contemplating the Impossible br /14.2 Counterfactual Reasoning br /14.3 Backward and Imperfect br /14.4 Gang of Four br /14.5 Signaling Games br /14.6 Rationalizability br /14.7 Roundup br / br /15 Knowing What to Believe br / br /15.1 Complete Information br /15.2 Bluffing br /15.3 Incomplete Information br /15.4 Russian Roulette br /15.5 Duopoly with Incomplete Information br /15.6 Purification br /15.7 Incomplete Information about Rules br /15.8 Roundup br / br /16 Getting Together br / br /16.1 Bargaining br /16.2 Cooperative Game Theory br /16.3 Cooperative Payoff Regions br /16.4 Nash Bargaining Problems br /16.5 Supporting Hyperplanes br /16.6 Nash Bargaining Solution br /16.7 Collusion in a Cournot Duopoly br /16.8 Incomplete Information br /16.9 Other Bargaining Solutions br /16.10 Roundup br / br /17 Cutting a Deal br / br /17.1 Noncooperative Bargaining Models br /17.2 The Nash Program br /17.3 Commitment in Bargaining br /17.4 Nash Threat Games br /17.5 Bargaining Without Commitment br /17.6 Going Wrong br /17.7 Roundup br / br /18 Teaming Up br / br /18.1 Coalitions br /18.2 Coalitional Form br /18.3 Core br /18.4 Stable Sets br /18.5 Shapley Value br /18.6 Applying the Nash Program br /18.7 Roundup br / br /19 Just Playing? br / br /19.1 Ethics and Game Theory br /19.2 Do People Play Fair? br /19.3 Social Choice Paradoxes br /19.4 Welfare Functions br /19.5 Impersonal Comparison of Utility br /19.6 More Bargaining Solutions br /19.7 Political Philosophy br /19.8 Which Fairness Norm? br /19.9 Roundup br / br /20 Taking Charge br / br /20.1 Mechanism Design br /20.2 Principals and Agents br /20.3 Commitment and Contracting br /20.4 Revelation Principle br /20.5 Providing a Public Good br /20.6 Implementation Theory br /20.7 Roundup br / br /21 Going, Going, Gone! br / br /21.1 Telecom Auctions br /21.2 Types of Auctions br /21.3 Continuous Random Variables br /21.4 Shading Your Bid br /21.5 Designing Optimal Auctions br /21.6 Common-Value Auctions br /21.7 Multiunit Auctions br /21.8 The Chopstick Auction br /21.9 Roundup A Great Cook offers an Immensely Varied Menu of Ideas Ken Binmore is the broadest thinker working within the classical game theory tradition. Unlike most technicians, he has read widely in philosophy, history, and anthropology, combining a passion for analytical detail with a deep feeling for the broad strokes of human behavior. These characteristics are reflected in this textbook on game theory, which is light-years more sophisticated than the standard fare, yet never sacrifices clarity or expositional elegance on the alter of mathematical or notational rigor. While I would urge anyone who is not math phobic and can recall a bit of high school algebra to tackle this book as an introduction to game theory, I am afraid it will not be widely used in courses because most instructors simply will not have the personal intellectual resources to teach this material. This is because Binmore tackles some of the deepest issues in game theory, whereas most instructors will have had the standard graduate course in which these issues are totally ignored. Moreover, in the interest of clarity, Binmore does not supply the full analytical frameworks in which these deep issues are normally cast, so the instructor will have few resources to deal with the material in a classroom setting. On the other hand, each chapter has plenty of problems that an instructor could use to illuminate the text, say by assigning half to the students and solving some of the remaining problems in class. br / br /Like every textbook writer before him, Binmore treats the Nash equilibrium with great reverence as a solution concept. I consider this a significant error, but at least Binmore tries to explain why (p. 18-19). His answer is sufficiently weak that the critical reader might decide to explore the issue himself. Binmore does not present a set of sufficient conditions under which agents will play a Nash equilibrium (for instance, as presented in the famous paper by Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995). Had he done that, the student might have a better idea of why the Nash equilibrium criterion is of limited value. Binmore's defense of the Nash concept draws on evolutionary game theory, but a notable absence from the book is a treatment of evolutionary game theory. A possible reason for this omission is that the math involved is fairly advanced (dynamical systems theory), but there are versions that avoid these technicalities for beginners (evolutionary stable strategies and stochastic dynamical systems a la Thomas Schelling, Robert Axtell, and Peyton Young). br / br /Among the refreshing positions taken by Binmore in this text is that equilibrium refinements are generally not worth much, except for subgame perfection, and even that is highly suspect except in special situations. Whereas backward induction (a.k.a. finding subgame perfect equilibria) is treated with great reverence in most text books, the technique has been under constant attack theoretically, and it is well known that individuals generally do not use more than a few rounds of backward induction. Binmore actually presents "The Surprise Test" (pp. 45-46) which I believe reveals the deepest contradictions of backward induction, although Binmore believes that the example shows nothing and has a simple non-paradoxical resolution. I believe he is wrong. Binmore's answer is that the teacher makes two statements (you will be tested on day next week, and when the test occurs, you will be surprised). Backward induction shows that the teacher's statement is false, but the student is mistaken by inferring that he will not be tested, since it could be the other half of the teacher's statement that is false. However, in fact, the test is given on Monday, and the student is surprised. So, the teacher was correct, contrary to the backward induction reasoning. Binmore is wrong, because the student was indeed surprised. br / br /Binmore does not particularly care for the concept of rationalizability (it isn't mentioned until p. 424) because it assumes nothing but Bayesian rationality with arbitrary priors. I think this is an error, because it leads him away from an investigation of when even rationalizability is violated. Thus, on p. 153, he confidently asserts "a rational player will never use a strongly dominated strategy." Yet, there are many games of strategic complementarity (e.g., Carlsson and van Damme, 1993), not to mention Basu's Traveler's Dilemma, in which the iterated elimination of strong dominated strategies leads to a unique Nash equilibrium that no collection of reasonable players would ever play. Binmore presents Basu's game in the problems on p. 174, and shows that if players don't care about small amounts of money, there is a plausible Nash equilibrium. This is an interesting idea that is pursued in different ways throughout the book, but is not systematically developed. br / br /One of the most embarrassing questions for classical game theory is why anyone would ever play a mixed strategy in a one-shot game. There are a couple of important attempts at answering this in the literature, and Binmore presents them uncritically. This is uncharacteristic of him. The attempt to define an equilibrium in "conjectures" solves the problem, but says nothing about how people actually play. Binmore presents the usual example of the plausibility of this approach, which uses Throwing Pennies, in which each player "conjectures" the other will use heads or tails with equal probability. But, what if the equilibrium probabilities are 99/100 and 1/100? Why shouldn't the players still play 1/2 and 1/2, in fact? The alternative, Harsanyi's purification theorem (p. 445) deals with this issue better, but it has its own serious limitations, which Binmore does not mention. br / br /Binmore's chapter on game theory and ethics is a gem, and his put-down of Kant in the introductory paragraph is just choice. Since Binmore has written at least three books on this subject, I would have expected more, but this book gives a foundational treatment. Binmore is a noted critique of behavioral economics, which he takes as being an enemy of game theory. However, behavioral economics is bare mentioned in this text, and never in a disparaging way. I think one of the major contributions of game theory is to the methodology of empirical economics, but this aspect of classical game theory is slighted in Binmore's text. br / br /There is much excellent material in this book that I have not had the space to mention, including bargaining and auctions, to which Binmore has personally contributed so much. This book is way beyond virtually all others in exposing the reader to the nitty-gritty issues of classical game theory. Whether that speaks for or against it's being a commercial success remains to be seen. br /
Our vBulletin book picks:
The Usborne Encyclopedia of World Religions: Internet-Linked (World Cultures) What Google Never Told You About Making Money with AdSense: 3rd Edition Implementing Google's Search Engine in Your ASP.NET Application The eBay Success Chronicles: Secrets and Techniques eBay PowerSellers Use Every Day to Make Millions Sams Teach Yourself Web Publishing with HTML & XHTML in 21 Days (4th Edition) (Sams Teach Yourself)

Find more vBulletin related products of interest.